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ABSTRACT
The Central American and the Caribbean Courts of Justice (CACJ and
CCJ) are hybrid judicial institutions. While their Member States envisioned
them as “EU-style” regional economic courts, they have explored the whole
extension of their formally delegated functions and have developed peculiar
expertise in matters relating to freedom of movement, human and
fundamental rights, and other politically fraught issues. The article explains
how two International Courts (ICs) seemingly established to build common
markets have come to adjudicate high-stakes political disputes, which,
ostensibly, have little to do with regional economic integration. The article
posits that the scholarship on delegation to ICs is only partially able to
provide an answer to this question. It, hence, suggests an alternative
theoretical framework by relying on transnational field theory and reflexive
sociology. The article demonstrates that, despite the rhetoric of their
founding documents, both the CACJ and the CCJ were only partially
established to pursue regional economic integration. Instead, both Courts
were fashioned at the crossroads of several—and at times even conflicting—
forms of legality, power battles, professional interests, and visions of the
world that shaped the Central American and Caribbean legal fields over
time. Seen through the diachronic lens of the interests, ideologies,
professional practices, and visions of the world of the actors inhabiting the
Central American and Caribbean legal fields, the involvement of the two
Courts in politically sensitive issues becomes less surprising, and—the
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article argues—it constitutes part of a strategy of the judges to legitimize the
two Courts vis-à-vis their peculiar institutional, political, and social
environments.
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INTRODUCTION

The Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) and the Caribbean Court
of Justice (CCJ) are the judicial organs of the Central American System of
Regional Integration (SICA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
respectively. The main function of these two Courts is to foster economic
and legal integration in Central America and the Caribbean. The CACJ
interprets and executes the Protocol of Tegucigalpa (the Protocol) and its
complementary instruments.1 The CCJ has compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction to solve the disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (the RTC).2
Despite this, both the CACJ and the CCJ serve only partially as “EUstyle” regional economic courts,3 while they have explored the whole
extension of their formally delegated functions,4 developing peculiar
expertise in matters relating to freedom of movement, human and
fundamental rights, and mega-politics.5 Among the Courts’ most important
cases,6 one may found judgments against Barbados for disrespecting the
CARICOM immigration policies7 and for violating death penalty standards
set up by international human rights treaties,8 against Belize for violating

1. Statute of the Central American Court of Justice art. 2, Dec. 11, 1992, available at
http://portal.ccj.org.ni/ccjdemo/normativa/.
2. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas art. 211, 2011, available at http://caricom.org/aboutcaricom/who-we-are/our-governance/the-revised-treaty/.
3. Both Courts have produced several rulings on trade disputes. See Salvatore Caserta, Regional
Integration through Law–the Interplay Between De Jure and De Facto Supranationality in Central
America and the Caribbean, 30 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 579, 579, 586 (2017).
4. In addition to its Community Law competencies entrenched in the Court’s Original Jurisdiction
(OJ), the CCJ has also an Appellate Jurisdiction (AJ), which aims at replacing the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council (JCPC) as the court of last resort of those Caribbean States that were once British
colonies. In the AJ, the CCJ rules over criminal and civil matters and it is competent to interpret the
constitutions of those states that have ratified such a jurisdiction. See Derek O’Brien & Sonia Foadi,
CARICOM and its Court of Justice, 37 COMM. LAW WORLD REV. 334, 334 (2008). Similarly, besides
being an EU-style Community Court, the CACJ is empowered to rule over inter-state conflicts, separation
of powers disputes between the constitutional organs of the SICA Member States and as an arbitral
tribunal. KATIN N. METCALF & IOANNIS PAPAGEORGIOU, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND COURTS OF
JUSTICE 55 (2005).
5. Throughout the paper, mega-politics is understood as: “matters of outright and utmost political
significance that often define and divide the whole polities.” Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of MegaPolitics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93, 93 (2008).
6. The judgments of both the CACJ and the CCJ are available on the two Courts’ websites.
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments-proceedings
and
http://portal.ccj.org.ni/ccj/
expedientes.
7. Shanique Myrie v. Barbados, OA 002, ¶ 101 (CCJ, 2012).
8. See generally Attorney General of Barbados v. Joseph and Boyce, CV 2 (CCJ, 2006).
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indigenous property rights,9 and, finally, against the Parliament of Nicaragua
for pursuing a soft coup d’état against then-President Enrique Bolaños.10
Although not unique in the landscape of International Courts (ICs)
outside Europe,11 the involvement of the CACJ and of the CCJ into
politically sensitive cases is theoretically puzzling. Like other regional
organizations, the CARICOM and the SICA have only partially progressed
towards their established goals of regional economic integration and the
barriers to intra-regional trade have not been systematically challenged
before the two Courts yet. Moreover, adjudicating high-stakes political
disputes is not entirely in sync with what the Governments of the SICA and
CARICOM States expect from the two Courts. These rulings also clash with
the reluctance of Central American and Caribbean national courts to deal
with such topics in their legal systems. Finally, the involvement of recently
established ICs into politically fraught disputes challenges several existing
theories that posit that these institutions shall adopt particular legal and
extralegal strategies when ruling in highly sensitive disputes in order to avoid
political pushbacks.12
The primary goal of this article is to explain how two ICs seemingly
established to build common markets and to enforce trade liberalization have
come to rule on high-stakes political disputes, which, ostensibly, have little
to do with regional economic integration and are not entirely in line with the
preference of the two Courts’ Member States. In so doing, the article shows
that the scholarship on delegation to ICs is only partially able to account for
the Central American and Caribbean experiences. The article, hence,
suggests an alternative explanation by relying on the theoretical tools
provided by transnational field theory and reflexive sociology.13 Through
this theoretical framework, the article demonstrates that, despite the rhetoric
9. See Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, 366, ¶ 126–27 (CCJ, 2015).
10. See generally Ingeniero Enrique Bolaños Geyer v. Asamblea Nacional de la República de
Nicaragua, CACJ n. 69-01-03-01-2005 (CACJ, 2005).
11. Both the Economic Community of West Africa Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court) and the East
African Court of Justice (EACJ) have recently expanded their jurisdiction to encompass human rights.
See Karen J. Alter, et al., A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 737 (2013). James T. Gathii, Mission Creep or a
Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy, 24 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 249, 250 (2013).
12. Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context, 14 EUR. J.
INT’L REL. 33, 33 (2008). Mikael R. Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court:
From Legal Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS (2011).
13. Mikael R. Madsen & Yves Dezalay, The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the
Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 433, 433 (2012). Mikael R. Madsen, Sociological
Approaches to International Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
400 (2014).
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of their founding documents, both the CACJ and the CCJ were only partially
established to pursue regional economic integration. Instead, both Courts
were fashioned at the crossroads of several—and at times even conflicting—
forms of legality, power relations, professional interests, and visions of the
world that have characterized the Central American and Caribbean legal
fields over time.
The CACJ was established, and then controlled, by a close network of
legal professionals—the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the Central
American States—whose main goal was to pacify and democratize Central
America by legal and judicial means. The CCJ emerged out of the
professional and ideological struggles fought by two elites of Caribbean
lawyers in the shadow of the process of Caribbean decolonization from the
United Kingdom. These two groups are a transnational power elite of
English-educated Caribbean lawyers, who have played a double role in the
struggle for Caribbean independence and in fostering the persistence of some
of the legal aspects of British colonialism, and a younger generation of
Caribbean-trained lawyers, willing to equip the CARICOM with the legal
and institutional tools to throw the Caribbean into the new global economy
at the end of the Cold War.14
Seen through the diachronic lens of the interests, ideologies,
professional practices, and visions of the world of the actors inhabiting the
Central American and Caribbean legal fields, the involvement of the two
Courts in politically sensitive issues becomes less surprising. I, therefore,
argue that this judicial behavior constitutes part of a strategy of the judges to
legitimize the two Courts vis-à-vis their peculiar institutional, political, and
social contexts. In particular, the two Courts did not limit themselves to
develop some kind of formal and neutral legal rationality à l’européenne.
Conversely, they aimed at producing substantively thick regional legal
systems in order to make themselves relevant in the eyes of the major
stakeholders in their fields of operation.
The article relies on 63 qualitative interviews with key stakeholders of
the SICA and the CARICOM.15 The interview-based research is informed
by the reflexive sociology of law and is aimed at understanding institutional
and legal developments from the perspective of the agents surrounding the
two Courts.16 For this purpose, the heuristic notion of the field proved to be
14. See generally Salvatore Caserta & Mikael R. Madsen, Between Community Law and Common
Law: The Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration and PostColonial Legacies, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 89 (2016).
15. The interviews were conducted during three field trips in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados,
Guyana, Nicaragua, and El Salvador between 2013 and 2014. See infra Appendix n. 1.
16. See generally Madsen & Dezalay, supra note 13.

CASERTA PUBLICATION VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

64

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/5/2017 1:44 PM

[Vol 28:59

a very helpful research tool. Framing the social space surrounding the two
Courts in terms of network of objective (adversarial) relations over the
meaning and purpose of these two institutions allowed me to capture the
social continuities (and discontinuities) in the construction of professional
practices and interests as well as visions of the world around the two
Courts.17 In this regard, the collective-relational biographies of the
stakeholders of the Central American and Caribbean legal fields provided
key evidence.18 By using the agents surrounding the two Courts as a vantage
point, the article unveils the hierarchical structures in which individuals and
groups operate, thus, objectivizing the socio-political dynamics and the very
interests at stake concerning both the CACJ and the CCJ.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follow. Section II examines the
theories of the delegation to ICs and formulates several hypotheses on the
judicial behavior of the two Courts that will be empirically tested through
the article. Section III presents the high-stakes political rulings decided by
the two Courts. These are chiefly concerned with freedom of movement and
human and fundamental rights in the Caribbean and inter-state conflicts and
other politically sensitive issues in Central America. Section IV analyzes this
case-law in the light of the hypotheses set forth in Section II, assessing the
virtues and the limits of the existing theories of delegation to ICs. Here, the
article shows that each theory alone does not fully explain the Central
American and Caribbean experiences. Consequently, Section V offers an
alternative explanation by providing a trans-historical and contextual
analysis of the creation and of the professional interests, ideologies, and
practices of the main stakeholders of the Caribbean and Central American
legal fields. In so doing, the article shows that both Courts were only
partially established to pursue regional economic integration, while they
were also envisaged as tools to pacify Central America and to complete the
process of Caribbean decolonization from the United Kingdom. This section
concludes by arguing that the involvement of the two Courts in politically
sensitive issues is part of an attempt of the judges of the two Courts to
legitimize these institutions vis-à-vis their peculiar socio-political contexts.
Section VI concludes by summarizing the main arguments of the paper.
II. THEORIES OF DELEGATION TO ICS
Why have the CACJ and the CCJ pushed themselves to the limits of
their mandates, making themselves known as tribunals willing to deal with
politically sensitive issues rather than limiting themselves to the “safer” role

17. Id. at 439.
18. See id. for an account of collective biographies.
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of regional economic courts? Theories of delegation to ICs would answer
this question in at least three different ways. For these theories, ICs are:
agents of states,19 trustees,20 and actors that alter national, regional, and
international politics.21
A.

Principal-Agent (P-A) Theory

For P-A theorists, delegation of power to an IC: “is a conditional grant
of authority from a principal [a state] to an agent [an IC] that empowers the
latter to act on behalf of the former. This grant of authority is limited in time
or scope and can be revocable by the principal.”22 In this view, ICs are
essentially ineffectual at forcing compliance with decisions that do not
conform to the interests of their principals. Different from national Supreme
Courts—which are backed up by the coercive power of the state—ICs lack
formal means for compelling states to comply with their decisions.23
This, in turn, means that the principals maintain a high degree of control
over the ICs they establish. Principals, in fact, decide: the appointment of the
judges, the amount of powers delegated to them, and, in most cases, even
their finances. As Paul Stephan puts it: “Knowing that they can be replaced,
the members of the tribunal have an incentive not to do anything that will
upset the countries with nominating authority.”24
Hypothesis #1: the CACJ and the CCJ would be expected to comply
with the interests of the delegating states, which would be estimated to
“punish” the two Courts for not doing so.
B.

Trustee Theories

Under Trustee Theories, ICs enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from
the states as these delegate powers: “to harness the authority of the Trustee
so as to enhance the legitimacy of political decision-making.”25 Four
19. See generally MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION,
(2003).
20. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 274 (1997); Alter, supra note 12, at 37.
21. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2013).
22. Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations and
Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 7 (Darren
G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
23. See generally Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions:
Constructing the EC’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert
O. Keohane eds., 1993).
24. Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification — The Agency Problem, 3 CHI. J.
INT.L L. 333, 337 (2002).
25. According to Alter, trustees are: “1) selected because of their personal reputation; 2) given
AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU
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conditions must be met for an IC to avoid state control: i) non-compliance
disputes with the treaties must be regularly filed before the IC; ii) the IC must
produce defensible rulings; iii) states shall give precedence to the reasons
given by the IC in its legal reasoning; and iv) the IC’s rulings must trigger
the interest of “compliance constituencies.”26 However, as posited by Karen
J. Alter: “should a Trustee stray beyond what the power elite or body politic
can accept, the option of removing a Trustee or eliminating the office
altogether remains.”27
A slightly different version of Trustee Theory is constituted by the
Constrained Independence Approach, according to which states allow ICs to
rule against their interests only when these decisions maximize the long-term
value of the treaty commitments to all parties. This, however, does not mean
that ICs are completely independent. States, in fact, can use refined
mechanisms to limit the potential judicial overreaching and to define the
“strategic space” in which ICs operate.28
Hypothesis #2: the CACJ and the CCJ would be expected to provide
ambitious interpretations of their treaties only when these are in line with
the overarching and long-term interests of the states or of other key
stakeholders of their systems.
C.

The Altered Politics Framework

Under the Altered Politics Framework, ICs expand the power of states
and of national actors.29 The specific institutional features of the so-called
“New-Style ICs” (i.e. compulsory jurisdiction and private access) allow nonstate actors to initiate litigation, thus increasing the power of ICs and
transforming these institutions into strategic tools for “compliance
constituencies” to pursue their interests and goals.30 Private parties’
participation in international litigation, thus, merges domestic and
international understanding of legality by making sure that compliance with
international law becomes consistent with the respect of domestic laws. In
the words of Alter: “ICs help alter state policy by using their institutional
position to aid actors inside and outside of states that share the objectives
independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria; and 3)
empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary.” Alter, supra note 12, at 35.
26. Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International
Regimes: the Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the
European Union, and the World Trade Organization, 1 J.L. & CTS., 62–63 (2013).
27. Alter, supra note 12, at 44.
28. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 904–05 (2005).
29. ALTER, supra note 21.
30. ALTER, supra note 21, at 19–20.
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inscribed into the law.”31 The conditions for this to occur are that: i) litigants
size the IC; ii) national actors care about legality; iii) legal entrepreneurs
invoke the IC and contribute to build compliance constituencies; and iv)
international rules are supported by national actors.32
Hypothesis #3: the CACJ and the CCJ would be expected to be seized
by constituencies willing to pursue political objectives which are not
reachable domestically. States will play along as long as powerful domestic
elites support international norms.
In brief, the three approaches presented above provide theoretical entry
points for explaining why states create ICs and why ICs behave in certain
ways. P-A theory chiefly focuses on how the self-interest of states operates
as a constraint on ICs. Conversely, Trustee Theory and the Altered Politics
Framework emphasize the conditions under which ICs may be able to
overcome constraints and avoid political pushbacks.
III. THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE TWO
COURTS
This section presents the politically sensitive rulings of the CACJ and
of the CCJ. As to the CCJ, these chiefly regard freedom of movement within
the CARICOM in the Original Jurisdiction (OJ) and human rights in the
Appellate Jurisdiction (AJ). The cases of the CACJ are different, as they
mostly regard inter-state conflicts and separation of powers disputes between
the constitutional organs of the SICA’s Member States.
A.

The Silent Rise of a Caribbean Human and Fundamental Rights
Court: From Death Penalty to Indigenous Rights

The CCJ has dealt with politically sensitive issues mainly in its AJ,
where the Court is aimed at replacing the appeals to the JCPC in London as
the apex judicial institution for those countries of the Caribbean that have
ratified this jurisdiction through constitutional amendments (hitherto,
Barbados, Guyana, Belize, and Dominica).
Perhaps the most important of these cases was The Attorney General of
Barbados and others v Joseph and Boyce.33 In this case, the CCJ was called
to rule over the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for murder
in Barbados. In addition, the Court touched upon other important issues, such
as its relationship with the JCPC and the effects of unincorporated

31. ALTER, supra note 21, at 20.
32. ALTER, supra note 21, at 62.
33. Attorney General of Barbados v. Joseph and Boyce, CV 2 (CCJ, 2006).
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international treaties in countries with a dualist tradition of international
law.34
The case had huge political connotations. Since 1994—when the JCPC
reversed its jurisprudence on capital punishment, establishing that a
prolonged delay of more than five years in carrying out a death sentence
constituted “inhuman and degrading punishment”35—the Caribbean
countries were in conflict with the English Court.36 The provisions of many
international human rights treaties of which the Caribbean States were
signatories, in fact, held that, in cases of appeals to an international organ by
death row inmates, the national judiciaries were required to suspend the
execution until a decision on the merit would be reached at the international
level. The procedures before international human rights instruments,
however, were often lengthy, causing delays in the execution of death row
inmates by national authorities. The JCPC’s new jurisprudence on the death
penalty, hence, placed the Caribbean countries in a position where they faced
the dilemma of either being forced to violate the five years term for executing
death row inmates set up by the same JCPC or of being in violation of the
international human rights treaties they were members of.37
This situation caused a significant upheaval in the Caribbean region:
Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago denounced the international
human rights instruments they were part of; almost at the same time, the CCJ
was established with an appellate jurisdiction aimed at replacing the JCPC
at the apex of the judicial systems of several Caribbean countries.38
The decision of the CCJ in Joseph and Boyce is revealing of the Court’s
willingness to deal with politically sensitive issues. To begin with, the CCJ
rejected the dualist argument put forward by the Barbadian Government,
according to which, even if ratified by the executive, international treaties
form no part of domestic law, unless they have been incorporated by the
legislature.39 At the same time, the CCJ did not endorse the alternative view
offered by the JCPC, which claimed that ratified but unincorporated
international treaties were directly effective and applicable.40 Here, the Court
34. In the specific case, on the effect of the IACHR in Barbados, IACHR was only signed and
ratified by the Barbadian officers but not transplanted into national law by the Parliament.
35. Pratt and Morgan v. the Attorney General of Jamaica, 2. A.C., Decision on Appeal from the
Court of Appeal of Jamaica, 35 (1994).
36. At that point, the JCPC was – and for many still is – the apex court of many Caribbean States.
37. Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1863–
65 (2002).
38. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14.
39. Attorney General of Barbados v. Joseph & Boyce, CV 2, ¶ 55–56 (CCJ, 2006).
40. The JCPC expressed this view in Lewis et al. v. Attorney General, 2 A.C., Decision on the
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borrowed a principle already developed by the Australian High Court,41
according to which unincorporated international treaties give rise to a
“legitimate expectation” to the procedures established by such treaties. In the
specific case in point, death row inmates would not be executed until
reasonable time is allowed for the international systems to run their course.42
Accordingly, the CCJ granted Joseph and Boyce the right to have their
petition to the Inter-American Human Rights System heard before Barbados
could conduct their execution.43
Joseph and Boyce was followed by other important human and
fundamental rights cases. One of these is Maya Leaders Alliance v. Attorney
General of Belize,44 in which the CCJ was called to rule over a long-standing
land rights dispute between the Belizean Government and the Mayan
minorities of Southern Belize. This was another case in which the CCJ
showed its willingness to become involved in politically sensitive issues. The
CCJ upheld the constitutional rights of the Mayas against arbitrary
deprivation of property as well as the right to protection of the law.45 In so
doing, the Court reversed the traditional (and narrow) reading of the right to
protection of the law, according to which this right merely encompassed
access to independent and impartial courts.46 Conversely, the CCJ described
the right to protection of the law in terms of a “broad spectrum right” that
“includes not only access to the court…but also [access] to administrative
tribunals with the power to affect constitutional rights or rights under the
Constitution of an individual.”47 The CCJ not only acknowledged the
existence of these rights, but also ruled that: “the right to protection of the
law may, in appropriate cases, require the relevant organs of the state to take
positive action in order to secure and ensure the enjoyment of basic

Appeal from the Court of Appeals of Jamaica, 51–52, 78 (2001). The relevant provision here was Article
4(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights, according to which: “Every person condemned to
death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be
granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such petition is pending decision by
the competent authority.” The Court noted that some Caribbean countries had also ratified other
international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which protect the right to life. See also Maya Leaders
Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, 366, ¶ 54 (CCJ, 2015).
41. See Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh [1995] HCA 20 183 CLR 273. See also
Matthew Groves, Treaties and Legitimate Expectations – The Rise and Fall of Teoh in Australia, 15
JUD’L. REV. 323, 323 (2010).
42. Joseph and Boyce, supra note 8, at 11.
43. Id. at 144.
44. Maya Leaders Alliance, supra note 9.
45. Id. at 32.
46. See id. at 39.
47. Id. at 49.
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constitutional rights.”48 Finally, the CCJ granted the Mayan communities
non-pecuniary damages to be quantified in a BZ $300.000.00 fund as a first
step toward compliance with the Belizean Government’s duty to protect
Maya customary land tenure.49
B.

The CCJ’s Fundamental Rights Turn on the Court’s Original
Jurisdiction

The CCJ has also gotten involved with politically sensitive issues in its
OJ, where, in principle, the Court is bound to interpret and apply the RTC
and secondary Community Law. In the period 2005−2011, this jurisdiction
was mainly used by large companies for common market related matters.50
From 2012, however, a different set of cases concerning freedom of
movement of CARICOM nationals reached the Court.
The first—and perhaps most important—among these was brought by
a Jamaican woman, Shanique Myrie, against the State of Barbados. Myrie
alleged that the behavior of the Barbadian border officers at the Bridgetown
Airport—who had mistreated her and denied her access to Barbados—
constituted a violation of her human and fundamental rights; her right to
freedom of movement within the CARICOM; and her right to nondiscrimination on the ground of nationality granted to CARICOM nationals
by the RTC.51
This decision is also revelatory of the CCJ’s willingness to get involved
with politically sensitive cases. Although the Court formally rejected the
human rights claim brought forward by Myrie stating that the Court is only
competent to interpret and apply the RTC and secondary laws emanating
from the Treaty,52 the judges ruled in favor of Myrie, ordering Barbados to
pay compensatory damages for the violation of her rights under the RTC.
Myrie had also important systemic effects, as it emboldened the protection
of fundamental rights in the CARICOM. In this decision, the CCJ deepened
the outreach of the doctrine of “correlative rights,” which the Court had
established in one of its previous decisions. According to this doctrine,
although formally the RTC does not give rights to individuals and only
establishes obligations on the Member States, these obligations are mirrored
by “correlative rights” when their non-fulfillment damages the interests of
individuals.53 Following Myrie, these “correlative rights” can now be
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 47.
Id. at 78.
Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14.
Myrie, supra note 7, at 2–4.
Id. at 6.
According to this doctrine, in the CARICOM, rights are not expressly given by the RTC but
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activated at the Community level by private litigants bringing cases directly
before the CCJ, without the exhaustion of local remedies and without the
need of filing cases before national judges.
Myrie was soon followed by two other disputes dealing with free
movement in the CARICOM. In these cases, Maurice Tomlinson, a Jamaican
LGBTI rights activist, asked the CCJ to declare the provisions of the
Immigration Acts of both Belize and Trinidad and Tobago banning the
entrance of homosexuals into these two countries in violation of his right to
free movement within the CARICOM.
The two Tomlinson cases were viewed by many as risking a backlash
against the Court because they potentially incited a conflict between
international human rights and local cultural sensitivities.54 It may also be
for this reason that the CCJ formally dismissed the two cases, ruling that the
practices of Belize and Trinidad and Tobago in relation to their Immigration
Acts were not incompatible with the CARICOM Law.55
Despite formally rejecting the case, in the judgment, the Court
introduced important principles that enhance the protection of fundamental
rights in the CARICOM through obiter dicta. Most notably, that: i)
CARICOM Law makes the admission of homosexual nationals from other
CARICOM States a legal requirement, notwithstanding contradictory
positions of national Immigration Acts; and ii) that the dismissal of
Tomlinson’s claims should not allow Belize and Trinidad and Tobago to
indefinitely retain laws seemingly in conflict with Community Law
obligations, as Member States are obliged to ensure that national laws,
subsidiary legislation and administrative practices conform to CARICOM
Law.56
C.

Litigating in the Shadow of the International Court of Justice: the
CACJ as an Inter-State Court

Similar to the CCJ, the CACJ did not refrain from getting involved with
politically sensitive issues either. Two of these cases involved Nicaragua and
Honduras and the ratification of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty between
Colombia and Honduras, through which several islands, marine areas, and
are rather extracted from obligations that the Treaty places on Member States. See TCL v. Guyana, [2009]
CCJ 1 (OJ). See also Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Consolidating Supranational Authority:
the Caribbean Court of Justice Decisions in the Tomlinson Cases, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 533, 533 (2016).
See generally DAVID BERRY, CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION LAW (2014).
54. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14.
55. According to the Court, in fact, both Belize and Trinidad and Tobago have repeatedly admitted
homosexuals – even the claimant, Mr. Tomlinson – in more than one instance. Maurice Tomlinson v. the
State of Belize and the State of Trinidad and Tobago, [2016] CCJ 1 (OJ), at [24].
56. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 5.
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submarine areas were transferred from Nicaragua and Jamaica to Honduras
and Colombia.57 As a reaction to the ratification of such Treaty, Nicaragua
imposed additional taxes over the goods coming from Honduras and even
suspended commercial relations with the latter. Shortly after, the two States
moved troops to their respective borders, getting ready for military action.
Honduras even declared a state of alert.58 Following these occurrences, in
1999, Nicaragua and Honduras each filed a case before the CACJ: Nicaragua
to ascertain the nullity of the ratification of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty;
Honduras to invalidate the Nicaraguan economic countermeasures as these
allegedly violated SICA law.
In its rulings, the CACJ revealed its proclivity for getting involved with
politically sensitive issues. The first hint in this regard is provided by the fact
that, even though the CACJ has formally no compulsory jurisdiction over
territorial disputes,59 the judges accepted the cases claiming that the Court’s
role is not limited to deciding technical issues related to regional economic
integration, but also to: i) transform the Central American isthmus into a
unified and pacific nation;60 ii) “reaffirm and consolidate Central American
self-determination;”61 and, iii) promote, in a harmonic way, the economic,
social, cultural, and political development of the Member States and of the
region.62 Furthermore, in deciding the merits of the cases, the Court did not
hesitate in ruling against the two States. The CACJ, in fact, declared: i) that
the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty infringed the principles and obligations of the
Protocol and that Honduras was directly responsible for the violations;63 and

57. CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999 and 26-06-03-12-1999. The dispute had originated already in 1858
and lasted until the 1960s, when the diplomatic mediation of the Organization of American States
persuaded the two states to submit the dispute to the ICJ, which eventually decided in favor of Honduras.
In 1986, however, the drafting of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty between Honduras and Colombia had
resurrected the conflict, pushing Nicaragua to file another case before the ICJ. Yet, as the actual
ratification of the Treaty was delayed, the controversy remained suspended until 1999, when – overnight
– the legislature of Honduras proceeded to the ratification of the Treaty.
58. Both Nicaragua & Honduras Claim Victory After Regional Court Rules on Boundary-Tariff
Issues,
NOTICEN:
CENT.
AM.
&
CARIBBEAN
AFFAIRS
(Dec.
6,
2001),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/REGION%3A+BOTH+NICARAGUA+%26+HONDURAS+CLAIM+
VICTORY+AFTER+REGIONAL+COURT. . .-a080643478.
59. See Costa Rica-El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Nicaragua-Panama: Statute of the Central
American Court of Justice, 34 I.L.M. 921, 930 (1995) (establishing that the Court has no jurisdiction over
territorial disputes between Member States, unless the two States formally agreed to submit the dispute
to the CACJ).
60. CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999, supra note 57, at considerando IX.
61. Tegucigalpa Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA)
art. 4 (g), Dec. 13, 1991, 1695 U.N.T.S. 400.
62. See id. at art. 3 (h).
63. CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999, supra note 57, at resuelve I). See also the dissenting opinions of
Justice Adolfo Leon Gomez and of Justice Eduardo Gauggel Rivas.
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ii) that by imposing additional taxes over the goods coming from Honduras
and by suspending commercial relations with the latter, Nicaragua had
violated SICA law.64
These two rulings are not exceptional, and they constituted the first step
toward transforming the CACJ from a mere regional economic court into the
ultimate Central American arbiter of inter-state disputes. In 2011, the Court
was called to preside over another highly sensitive and long-standing
territorial dispute involving Costa Rica and Nicaragua.65 In this case, two
Nicaraguan NGOs asked the CACJ to stop Costa Rica from constructing a
highway in the environmentally protected area of the Rio San Juan. The case
assumed even more political connotations because, since the Court’s
establishment, Costa Rica had repeatedly refused to submit to its jurisdiction
for reasons connected to the CACJ’s broad competences. In this decision,
the CACJ proved itself not only not to be averse to politically sensitive
issues, but also that these types of cases are a central aspect of its
competences. First, despite the vehement protests of the Costa Rican
Government, the CACJ declared its jurisdiction to hear the case.66 Second,
again ignoring the Costa Rican Government’s blistering remarks, the CACJ
did not hesitate in condemning the State for damaging the environment and
for having violated several international and regional treaties.
D.

Democratization through Judicial Means: the CACJ as a Regional
Constitutional Court

The willingness of the CACJ to deal with politically sensitive issues is
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, in the early 2000s, the Court was
called to solve a high profile dispute between two former Nicaraguan
Presidents, both members of the Liberal Party, Enrique Bolaños, and his
predecessor, Arnoldo Alemán.67 The conflict initiated as early as 2002, when
the newly elected Bolaños led an anti-corruption campaign, which caused
the imprisonment of Alemán. In an attempt to escape the conviction, Alemán
64. CACJ 26-06-03-12-1999, supra note 57, at resuelve I) and II).
65. CACJ 12-06-12-2011. The tension between the two states peaked in 2010, when Nicaragua
began to build an inter-oceanic channel in the area of the Rio San Juan. In response, Costa Rica sent
police officers to its borders, as did Nicaragua. Costa Rica then filed a case at the ICJ alleging that the
Nicaraguan military activities in the area constituted a breach of treaty obligations toward Costa Rica. In
2011, the ICJ provisionally ruled that both Costa Rica and Nicaragua must refrain from sending or
maintaining security forces in the area and that the Nicaraguan dredging was allowed, as it had been
conducted on Nicaraguan territory. See Press Release, International Court of Justice Press Release No.
2010/38, Costa Rica institutes proceedings against Nicaragua and requests the Court to indicate
provisional measures (Nov. 19, 2010); See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border
Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Rep. 2011, p. 6.
66. Costa Rica-El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Nicaragua-Panama, supra note 59, at 932.
67. CACJ 69-01-03-01-2005, supra note 10.
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filed a case before the CACJ claiming his immunity as a member of the
Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). The CACJ, however, rejected
the case, ruling that the suspension of the national immunity decided by the
Nicaraguan Parliament had also caused the decay of Alemán’s regional
immunity.
Having lost the first legal battle before the CACJ, Alemán attempted to
politically isolate Bolaños by means of an agreement (El Pacto) with the
leftist Sandinista Party. In short, the part of the Liberal Party allied with
Alemán and the Sandinistas coalesced with the goal of passing constitutional
reforms aimed at disempowering and eventually impeaching Bolaños,
securing for themselves the control of key political institutions, and,
ultimately, gaining amnesty for Alemán. Soon after El Pacto, the National
Assembly of Nicaragua passed a bill revoking the President’s power to
directly appoint key governmental figures. In response, President Bolaños
filed a motion before the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. This case was,
however, rejected by the Nicaraguan highest judicial organ, which even
declared the section f) of Article 22 of the Statute of the CACJ
unconstitutional and inapplicable.68 Finally, President Bolaños, in a
desperate attempt to cling to his chair, invoked the contested Article 22 and
dragged the Nicaraguan Parliament before the CACJ, asking the regional
court to declare the invalidity of the constitutional reforms.69
This case put an immense amount of strain on the CACJ, especially on
the two Nicaraguan judges, who were called to take a stance either against
their own Supreme Court or against their own President. Additionally, being
that the seat of the Court was located in Nicaragua, the Court ended up in the
midst of the Nicaraguan political debate and, during the proceedings, people
gathered in front of the Court’s Headquarters to voice their discontent with
the judges’ involvement in the dispute.70 The situation was so charged that
one person close to the Court revealed that one of the two Nicaraguan judges
avoided getting too involved with the proceedings in order to avoid
criticisms and even retaliations against him.71 The CACJ, however, kept the
pressure at bay. First, the Court admitted the case and even released a
preliminary measure, asking the Nicaraguan Parliament to suspend the
reforms while its decision was pending. Second, the Court declared the

68. Sentencia [S.] No. 15, 29 March 2005, Sala Constitucional, [Supreme Court of Justice] p. 47,
Cons. I (Nicar.). Article 22(f) of the Statute empowers the CACJ to rule over separation of powers
disputes between the constitutional organs of the Member States.
69. Interview n.6.
70. Interview n.5.
71. Interview n.7, n.8.
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reforms initiated by the Legislative Assembly of Nicaragua in violation both
of the Nicaraguan Constitution and of several treaties of the SICA.72
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE CACJ AND OF
THE CCJ FOR THE THEORIES OF DELEGATION TO ICS
This section analyzes how the experiences of the CACJ and of the CCJ
relate to the theories of delegation discussed in section II, namely, P-A
Theory, Trustee Theories, and the Altered Politics Framework.
As to the P-A Theory, the experiences of the CACJ and of the CCJ
contradict many of its main assumptions. The two Courts did not act
consistently with the wishes of their principals. Although the founders of the
Courts initially provided them with far-reaching powers, once these were up
and running, both their Member States and key Central American and
Caribbean legal and political elites repeatedly—and rather explicitly—
threatened to withdraw their support if the two Courts got too involved with
politically sensitive issues. Hence, by presiding over claims involving human
and fundamental rights (the CCJ) and inter-state and separation of powers
within the constitutional organs of the Member States issues (the CACJ),
both Courts defied the interests of their principals. More specifically, the
rulings presented above placed the CACJ and the CCJ at odds with the
interests of many of their Member States, according to which both the SICA
and the CARICOM are mere fora for handling diplomatic and trade matters,
and not supranational legal communities aimed at protecting and enforcing
the rule of law and democratic governance. The experiences of the CACJ
and of the CCJ also contradict P-A Theory because, although the two Courts
have often gone against the interests of their Member States, these have not
punished them for overstepping their authority. As to the CCJ, although
discontent with the outcome of Myrie, Barbados complied with the decision
without challenging the authority and legitimacy of the Court. Moreover,
regardless of the Court’s highly political and controversial judgments in
Pratt and Morgan and The Maya cases, the authority of the CCJ in its
Appellate Jurisdiction has increased and several undecided states even took
significant steps to fully ratify such jurisdiction.73 As to the CACJ, the
Member States of the SICA have attempted to curtail the Court’s
competencies, in 1997, with the Declaration of Panama II, again, in 1998,
72. See CACJ 69-01-03-01-2005, supra note 10, at 25–26.
73. Dominica accessed the Appellate Jurisdiction in 2015, while several East Caribbean countries
began consultations in relation to their accession to the Court. See Media Release, Caribbean Court of
Justice, CCJ President Travels to Antigua for Initial Consultations (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/news/ccj-president-travels-to-antigua-for-initial-consultations.
On the authority of the CCJ, see generally Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14.
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with the Declaration of Managua, and, finally, in 2003-2004, in two
Presidential Meetings held in Belize and Guatemala. These attempts,
however, remained un-executed for lack of political consensus at both the
national and regional level, thus leaving the competencies of the CACJ
intact.74
The Trustee Theories, conversely, provide valuable insights for
explaining the experiences of the CACJ and of the CCJ. The Central
American and Caribbean judges did not behave as mere agents of their
delegating authorities, but as independent professionals attempting to bring
their own legitimacy and authority to the two Courts. Moreover, the judges
not only produced bold rulings on very sensitive topics, but they also
justified their claims on legal grounds by relying on their “superior”
expertise and knowledge of the relevant treaties. Trustee Theories are finally
corroborated by the fact that the two Courts embarked in ambitious readings
of their treaties to make themselves palatable to broader pools of
“compliance partners,”75 making them the beneficiaries of their
jurisprudence, as I will discuss in detail in Section V of the paper.
Other assumptions of Trustee Theories, however, do not entirely fit the
Central American and Caribbean experiences. Trustee Theories claim that
ICs become effective when they enjoy the institutional support of the other
organs of their communities, such as the Heads of Government and
Commissions and/or Regional Secretariats.76 This is not the case in Central
America or in the Caribbean, where both Courts were (and are) not supported
by other institutional actors in developing their case-law.77 Moreover,
according to Trustee Theories, ICs are more likely to produce ambitious
rulings when significant disputes of non-compliance with treaty law are
regularly brought to their attention.78 This does not occur in Central America
or in the Caribbean, where non-compliance disputes with treaty law are
preferably solved through diplomatic and political channels rather than
through adjudication.79
The CACJ and the CCJ also defy some of the assumptions of the
Constrained Independent Theory, especially regarding the part of the
74. METCALF & PAPAGEORGIOU, supra note 4, at 97–103.
75. Compliance partners are domestic and transnational actors who “either orchestrate compliance
or construct counter-pressures that alter the political balance in favor of policies that better cohere with
international legal obligations.” ALTER, supra note 21, at 20.
76. See generally JONAS TALLBERG, MAKING STATES COMPLY: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE & THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNAL MARKET (1999).
77. See generally Caserta, supra note 3.
78. Sweet & Brunell, supra note 26, at 62–63.
79. See O’Brien & Foadi, supra note 4, at 346–47; see generally OTILIO MIRANDA, DERECHO DE
LA COMUNIDAD CENTROAMERICANA (2013).
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approach that claims that states establish independent ICs to promote the
credibility of their commitments.80 The Central American and Caribbean
States established the two Courts chiefly to enforce trade liberalization and
to limit the widespread disregard of SICA and CARICOM laws and policies.
Yet, both Courts have largely failed at enforcing market integration
commitments both in terms of number of cases decided and in terms of the
impact of their Community Law jurisprudence on the realities of Central
American and Caribbean integration.81
The Altered Politics Framework also provides valuable insights for
explaining the experiences of the CACJ and the CCJ. In line with this model,
both Courts have taken into consideration the interest of not only the
Governments of their Member States, but also those of broader sets of
“compliance constituencies” when deciding their cases. One key assumption
of the Altered Politics Framework, however, is not present in Central
America and the Caribbean. International law, human and fundamental
rights, as well as democratization and pacification issues do not necessarily
enjoy the political support of those actors who are in power in the national
and regional political arenas, such as the SICA and CARICOM Heads of
Government and the national judges. Right before the beginning of the CCJ’s
operations, the heated conflict between the JCPC and many Caribbean
countries on death penalty issues resulted in widespread skepticism
regarding international law and human rights throughout the whole region.82
While the passing of time has softened the Caribbean turmoil on such topics,
a general lack of support for these instruments remains. Similarly, the
enthusiasm toward democratization and pacification that permeated the
Central American region during the late 1980s and early 1990s soon
softened, and, still today, the countries of the isthmus are struggling to
complete their transition to democracy.83 Hence, the claim that the CACJ and
the CCJ assist governments and other national actors in adopting policies
that may be domestically controversial but consistent with international law
does not find full empirical confirmation.84
In addition to these theory-specific assessments, other more general
considerations can be brought forward to corroborate the point already
expressed in this section. Delegation theories cannot entirely account for the

80.
81.
82.
83.

See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 20.
Interview n.9. See also Caserta, supra note 3.
See Helfer, supra note 37.
See, e.g., ELLEN MOODIE, EL SALVADOR IN THE AFTERMATH OF PEACE: CRIME, UNCERTAINTY
AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2010); CENTRAL AMERICA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: LIVING
TRANSITION AND REIMAGINING DEMOCRACY (Jennifer L. Burrell & Ellen Moodie eds., 2013).
84. See generally ALTER, supra note 21.
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behavior of both the CACJ and of the CCJ because their analysis chiefly
focuses on the political dynamics related to the formal act of empowerment.
In turn, this means that these theories can only account for why states create
ICs at a specific point in time and that they do not (and cannot) address
broader issues related to the process of institutionalization of ICs or to what
direction ICs may take once established.
The Theories of delegation also seem to imply that delegating states are
the only relevant actors whose interests must be unveiled if one wants to
understand the creation as well as the reasons of the behavior of an IC.85 Yet,
the fact that both the CACJ and the CCJ challenged the interests of their
Member States, and that these States have not reacted negatively in response,
reveal that the question of compliance or non-compliance with an IC’s
decision is more complex than what these Theories tend to suggest and that
it involves a multitude of actors and interests beyond states. In this regard,
Trustee Theories and the Altered Politics Framework are more suited to
explain the CACJ and the CCJ as they expand the analysis to a broader pool
of actors. Yet, even these two theories are not entirely satisfactory as they,
ultimately, rely on pre-defined and rationalist constructions of the interests
of the agents interacting with ICs. Both Trustee Theories and the Altered
Politics Framework frame ICs in terms of welfare-improving solutions to
problems of incomplete information and high-transaction costs between
states and other rational actors. Yet, as it will be shown in the following
section of the paper, the interests of individual actors and groups hardly
follow pre-defined trajectories. Interests are, in fact, socially constructed
and, either directly or indirectly, influenced by social rules, cultural contents,
visions of the world, ideas of legality and other similar factors.86
In sum, although some of the above discussed theories provide useful
insights for understanding the CACJ and of the CCJ, each theory alone
cannot fully account for the two Courts’ involvement with politically
sensitive issues.

85. In this discussion, it is worth adding that, recent scholarship has pointed out that States are not
monolithic institutions with uniform and singularly identifiable interests as these theories seem to assume.
On the contrary, States are disaggregated in many independent flows of power characterized by technical
skills, each with their own specific interest to protect and fulfill. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 12 (2009).
86. This is in line with constructivist and sociological approaches to international organizations and
courts. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 2 (2004); Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A
Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, 61 AMERICAN SOC. REV. 656, 660 (1996); Antoine
Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Government of the European Union (For
a Renewed Research Agenda), 2 INT. POL. SOC. 128, 131 (2008); Madsen & Dezalay, supra note 13.
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V. BRINGING THE SOCIAL BACK IN: EXPLAINING THE
INVOLVEMENT OF THE CACJ AND OF THE CCJ WITH
POLITICALLY SENSITIVE DISPUTES
If the theories discussed above cannot fully grasp the reasons why the
CACJ and CCJ have gotten involved with politically sensitive issues, how
can we theoretically make sense of the behavior of these two Courts?
Transnational Field Theory and Reflexive Sociology provide the
theoretical and methodological tools to answer this puzzle. These theories
approach ICs—and more generally (legal) institutions—not in terms of
autonomous entities that develop and change through endogenous and selfreferential logics, but rather as social constructions deeply embedded in
differentiated fields of power, which shape their activities through a variety
of processes (i.e., professional interests, visions of law, ideologies,
education, socialization, and so on).87
The focus of the analysis, hence, shifts from a trans-governmentalist
line of thinking—according to which international institutions are the spinoff
of rationally constructed interests of transnational constellations of agents—
to a more sociologically grounded vision that constructs ICs in terms of
institutional crystallizations of diverging and competing national modes of
production, professional interests, and visions of law.88 In other words,
Transnational Field Theory and Reflexive Sociology, by allowing an
examination of the interplay between the agency of ICs and the
transformation of the social structures in which they act and evolve, shed
light on the making of these institutions, pinpointing to how larger societal
and geopolitical forces impact the evolution of ICs and of their behavior.89
In this regard, the Bourdieusian notion of the field90 is an especially
pertinent research tool. The field, in fact: “populates these institutions [ICs]
with competing actors and tracks their socialization, personal trajectories,
and professional careers,” thus allowing to trace: “the socio-genesis of
transnational institutions and groups as well as the power relations in which
they are embedded.”91

87. See Vauchez, supra note 86. See also Madsen & Dezalay, supra note 13.
88. Similar in this regard, to what was claimed by the sociology of organizations. See generally,
e.g., Paul J. Di Maggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphsim and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150 (1983); RICHARD W. SCOTT,
ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 20 (1994).
89. Madsen, supra note 13, at 448–49.
90. Social fields are “spaces of contestation over defining the law in which different agents occupy
positions relative to the portfolio of capitals they can muster and which are ‘capitalized’ according to the
logic of the specific field in question.” Id. at 400.
91. Vauchez, supra note 86.
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In what follows, it will become clear that power relations, professional
practices, interests, visions of the world, and the national positioning of the
Central American and Caribbean legal and political elites in their respective
legal fields have played a fundamental role in shaping both the institutional
outlook and—most importantly—the practices of the CACJ and of the CCJ,
pushing them to go beyond their roles as regional economic courts and to
explore the full extension of their powers.
The paper does not provide a full-fledged analysis of the Central
American and Caribbean legal fields. I rather use the logic of the field to
highlight two different—yet inherently correlated—aspects, which are of
pivotal importance for understanding the involvement of the two Courts with
politically sensitive issues: i) the trans-historical trajectories of the main
structuring forces of the Central American and Caribbean legal fields; and
ii) the professional paths of the judges eventually chosen to sit on the benches
of the two Courts, which are strongly linked to these structural dynamics.
A. The Protracted Geneses of the CACJ and the CCJ
In the two following sub-sections, I provide a socio-genesis of the two
ICs object of enquiry, showing that the need of establishing two regional
economic Courts to support the implementation of the policies of the SICA
and the CARICOM was only the most recent development characterizing the
Central American and Caribbean legal fields. Conversely, the process of
creation of the two Courts was significantly shaped by other—very
different—structural forces that have characterized the Central American
and Caribbean legal fields over time. These forces are: decolonization from
the United Kingdom in the Caribbean, and pacification through legal and
judicial means in Central America.
Ultimately, this shows that both Courts are not only mere byproducts of
the increased legalization of international relations that followed the end of
the Cold War,92 but that this legalization layered on top of several other
forms of legality, interests, normative ideas, and social practices that have
characterized the Central American and Caribbean legal fields over time.
1. The Creation of the CCJ at the Crossroads of Decolonization and
Regional Integration
The CCJ is the institutional crystallization of two divergent movements
of the Caribbean legal field.93 The first is the one correctly captured by the
main narrative related to the CCJ, according to which the Court is an EU92. See LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 17 (Judith L. Goldstein, et al. eds., 2001); ALTER,
supra note 21.
93. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 90.
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style regional economic court94 aimed at reviving the CARICOM, which, up
to that point, had been highly dysfunctional and ineffective at securing
compliance of the Member States with its policies.95
Once the Court is approached from a more trans-historical and actorbased perspective, however, it becomes apparent that, above and beyond
being the judicial institution of the CARICOM, the present CCJ constitutes
the last of several failed attempts at replacing the JCPC as the apex court of
the former English West Indian colonies.
The first proposal of a Caribbean Court of Appeal was first advanced in
1901, when a Jamaican newspaper suggested to replace the system of
colonial justice with a West Indian Court of Appeal.96 Similar proposals were
advanced in 1932 at the Conference of Roseau and in 1947 at the Montego
Bay Conference. An actual Caribbean Court of Appeal was eventually
established to replace the JCPC as part of the Federation of the West Indies
in 1958. Yet, as the Federation crashed in 1962 and the Caribbean States
achieved their independence singularly, many of them opted for maintaining
the JCPC as their court of last resort. The discussions related to the creation
of a local court to replace the JCPC, however, continued intermittently until
the 1990s, when the Caribbean legal professions entered into a heated
conflict with the JCPC on issues related to the constitutionality of mandatory
death penalty for murder granted by many constitutions of the States of the
region. Thereafter—in conjunction with the need of vesting the CARICOM
with a Community Court to respond to the challenges posed by the end of
the Cold War—the present CCJ was established as both an appellate and an
international court.97
This double movement characterizing the long period of gestation of
the Court significantly shaped the constellation of the Caribbean legal field.
In the shadow of these two structural forces, a professional and power
struggle between two social groupings of lawyers, each with very different
ideas related to Caribbean Community Law, took place. Initially, the field
was dominated by a relatively small but powerful group of English-educated
Caribbean lawyers. Central figures of this social constellation of legal
94. See, e.g., Derek O’Brien & Sonia Morano-Foadi, The Caribbean Court of Justice and Legal
Integration within CARICOM: Some Lessons from the European Community, 8 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. &
TRIBS. 399, 400 (2009).
95. See, e.g., THE WEST INDIAN COMM’N, TIME FOR ACTION: REPORT OF THE WEST INDIAN
COMMISSION (1992); O’Brien & Foadi, supra note 4, at 347.
96. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, THE DAILY GLEANER, Mar. 6, 1901,
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/ccj-concept-to-reality.
97. For a more detailed history of these developments, see SPENCER MAWBY, ORDERING
INDEPENDENCE: THE END OF EMPIRE IN THE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN (1947-1969) 150 (2012). See
also, Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 90.
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professionals were, among others: Karl Hudson Phillips,98 Ramesh
Lawrence Maharaj,99 Fenton Ramsahoye,100 as well as Michael de la Bastide
and Sir Dennis Byron, who would later become Presidents of the CCJ.101
Because of the absence of a Faculty of Law in the region,102 these
individuals obtained their legal education in the United Kingdom. During
this English passage, these lawyers developed specific sensitivities related to
Caribbean Community Law both as an extension of (English) human and
fundamental rights and as a (hypothetical) tool for completing the circle of
Caribbean independence from its metropolitan power. Eventually, when
these lawyers returned to the Caribbean, they ended up monopolizing the
legal job market practicing law transnationally in all jurisdictions of the
Caribbean and before the JCPC.103
The strong connection to the colonial metropolis developed by this old
generation of Caribbean lawyers instilled in them, and in many other
Caribbean lawyers, a strong skepticism related to any kind of local legal
knowledge. Importantly, for a long time, the old lawyers were suspicious in
relation to the project of a Caribbean Court, as they feared that replacing the
JCPC with a local judicial institution would curtail human and fundamental
rights standards in the region. At the same time, the creation of a local court
98. Mr. Hudson Phillips graduated in law at the University of Cambridge in 1956 and called at the
bar at Gray’s Inn, London. He served as member of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago from 1966 to
1976. From 1969 to 1973, he was appointed as Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad
and Tobago. He made a name for himself as a trans-Caribbean lawyer as he practiced law in several
jurisdictions. He participated in the murder trial of the Grenadian Prime Minister – Mr. Maurice Bishop
– as well as in many high-profile cases throughout the Caribbean. In 1999 he was also appointed as
President of the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago. In 2003, he was appointed as the first judge of
the International Criminal Court.
99. Mr. Maharaj graduated in law in London in 1969 and called at the bar at Inner Temple. He was
admitted to practice in several Caribbean countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Grenada. He was a member of the Trinidadian Parliament in more than one legislature
and he served as Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago from 2000.
100. Mr. Ramsahoye graduated in law at the London University in 1953, called to bar at Lincoln’s
Inn in 1953, awarded a PhD in Comparative Land Law from the London School of Economics and
Political Sciences in 1959. He is licensed under the bars in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados,
Jamaica, and the Territories of the Eastern Caribbean included Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands.
He holds the record for making the most appearances before the JCPC in the Caribbean. Additionally, he
has been member of the Guyanese Parliament from 1961 to 1973 and Attorney General of Guyana from
1961 to 1964.
101. I will discuss the professional profiles of both Mr. de la Bastide and Sir Byron in the following
sub-section of the paper.
102. The first local Faculty of Law was established only in 1970 in Barbados. The Faculty of Law,
About Us, THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES, https://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/Law/about-us.aspx (last
visited Oct.24, 2017). This was soon followed by other Caribbean Faculties of Law certified to issue legal
diplomas in Jamaica (1973), Trinidad & Tobago (1973) and Bahamas (1998). Legal studies are now also
available in Guyana, http://uog.edu.gy/faculties/fss/department-of-law.
103. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 93–96.
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contested their professional privileges and power, as this directly challenged
the hegemony of the English Common Law as the law of the land of the
Caribbean States.104
By the 1970s, however, the old lawyers’ unique position of power in
the field began to be challenged by a newer generation of Caribbeaneducated lawyers.105 A key role in this development was played by the
opening of the Faculty of Law of the University of West Indies (UWI) in
Barbados in 1970, which, over time, nurtured a generation of Caribbean
lawyers less skeptical towards the idea of replacing the appeals to the JCPC
with a local Court of Appeal and supportive of the idea of strengthening the
integration project by, among other things, equipping the CARICOM with
an international judicial institution.106 These two competing professional and
ideological views related to Caribbean Community Law remained in conflict
until the early 2000s, when, as a result of the new JCPC human rights
jurisprudence on capital punishment, both the young and the old Caribbean
lawyers coalesced to establish the present CCJ with both Appellate and
Original Jurisdictions.
This diachronic and actor-based socio-genesis of the CCJ provides
important evidence for explaining the Court’s involvement in politically
sensitive issues. From this history, it emerges that the present CCJ is not only
a recent byproduct of the legalization process triggered by the end of the
Cold War, but also an institutional crystallization of continuous and
overlapping dialectics between the different levels of structures and
discourses of power at play in the emerging field of Caribbean law over the
course of history.
This is not mere historical curiosity, as the equilibrium of power of the
field surrounding the CCJ remains rather fragile even today. The power
battle between the older and the younger lawyers over the definition of
Caribbean Community Law is still ongoing. This can be seen, for example,
in that the widespread support enjoyed by the CCJ at the end of the 1990s,
which stemmed from the outrage against the death penalty rulings of the
JCPC, had already vanished when the Court began its operations in 2005. At
this point, a new set of critics backed up by the English-educated elites began

104. According to one interviewee, several law firms in Trinidad specialize in cases before the Privy
Council. They have generally been opposed to the CCJ for fear of losing clients. Interview n. 3.
105. 1970 is the year in which the first truly Caribbean Faculty of Law was established in the context
of the University of the West Indies. See, The Faculty of Law, About Us, THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST
INDIES, https://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/Law/about-us.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
106. See Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 95–96.
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to label the newly established tribunal a “hanging court,” a court specifically
set up to continue the use of capital punishment in the Caribbean.107
It is, thus, not by chance that one of the first, and perhaps most
important, cases decided by the present CCJ concerned precisely death
penalty issues and the CCJ’s relationship with the JCPC. Likewise, it is not
accidental that the Court is transforming its international jurisdiction from a
venue for trade dispute into one dedicated to regional enforcement of human
and fundamental rights, thus showing to its constituencies to be a Court able
to handle the Caribbean system of justice.
In conclusion, all of the above shows that the idea of establishing a
regional court to deal with the technicalities of Caribbean economic
integration was only a relatively recent occurrence that layered on top of a
long-lasting discourse of politically sensitive ideas and power, mostly
centered on decolonization, as well as human and fundamental rights. For
more than a century, the main structuring forces of the Caribbean legal
field—and, accordingly, the main professional interests and visions of law
of the legal and political elites within that field—revolved not so much
around the idea of economically and legally integrating the region, but rather
around the more politically contested production of a local jurisprudence on
human and fundamental rights able to end the post-colonial legal and
political dependence of the Caribbean from the JCPC and the United
Kingdom. This, in my view, contributes to explaining the CCJ’s
predisposition—or at least the missing reluctance—towards getting involved
with politically sensitive issues.
2. The Creation of the CACJ at the Crossroads of Pacification and
Regional Integration
Similar to the CCJ, the CACJ is likewise not a mere byproduct of the
legalization of Central American economic integration triggered by the end
of the Cold War, but the institutional crystallization of the different
movements that characterized the Central American social and legal fields
over time. Also in the case of the CACJ, the first of these movements has
been highlighted by the scholarship on the CACJ, according to which the
Court is an EU-style regional economic court aimed at enforcing the policies
of the SICA.108 However, once the Court is approached from a transhistorical and actor-based perspective, it becomes clear that the need to
establish a regional economic court in Central American is a relatively recent
107. See, e.g., Leonard Birdsong, The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of
British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rev. 197, 203
(2005).
108. See, e.g., METCALF & PAPAGEORGIOU, supra note 4, at 19–20.
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development, and that the CACJ is also—if not above all—the last attempt
at creating an IC to pacify and democratize Central America by legal and
judicial means.109
The argument is even more compelling than in the case of the CCJ,
because several international judicial institutions aimed at pacifying the
Central American region actually existed before the present CACJ. The most
important of these attempts was made in 1907, when the Cartago Court—the
first IC in world history—was established with the task of “maintaining
peace and harmony inalterably […] without being obliged to resort in any
case to the employment of force,”110 and, ultimately, of representing the
“national conscience of Central America.”111 While the Cartago Court was
short lived,112 the idea of pacifying Central America by means of an
international judicial institution persisted up until the early 1990s, when, in
conjunction with the peace negotiations of Esquipulas I and II and the
reformation of the system of Central American regional economic
integration, the present CACJ was established.113
This double movement characterizing the Central American legal field
holds key explanatory value for understanding the CACJ’s involvement in
politically sensitive issues. The two structuring forces of the field
significantly influenced the general constellation of the Central American
109. The first proposals for a regional court were advanced in the early 20th Century, when the States
of the region – under the auspices of the United States – created several arbitral tribunals and courts in an
effort to soften their political and territorial controversies. THOMAS L. KARNES, THE FAILURE OF UNION:
CENTRAL AMERICA 1824–1975 (1976).
110. Preamble of the Convention.
111. Id., at Article 13.
112. The Court was shut down in 1918, after it was called to rule over two highly political cases
concerning the exclusive right for building a second inter-oceanic channel through Nicaragua granted to
the United States by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. CARLOS JOSÉ GUTIÉRREZ G., LA CORTE DE CARTAGO
137 (2009).
113. In 1921, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador established a regional Supreme
Court to reduce the legal differences between the States. In 1922, the International Central American
Tribunal was established with the power to rule over any controversy arising between them, whatever its
nature or origin might be. This Tribunal was ratified by four states (El Salvador declined to ratify it), and
it remained in force until 1934. Manley O. Hudson, The Central American Court of Justice, AM. J. INT’L
L. 759, 783–84 (1932). In 1962, in the framework of the Organization of Central American States
(ODECA), a Corte de Justicia Centroamericana was established with the power to rule over every
conflict arising between the Member States. Article 14 and 15 of the Second Charter of the ODECA.
Carta de la Organizacion Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA), Costa Rica-Nicar.-Hond.-El Sal.-Guat.,
Oct. 14, 1951, full text of the Treaty is available at http://www.rijia.org/assets/1carta-de-la-organizacionde-la-odeca.pdf. This institution, however, was never called to decide any relevant issue. See, ORLANDO
MEJÍA HERRERA, LA UNIÓN EUROPEA COMO MODELO DE INTEGRACIÓN: ANÁLISIS COMPARATIVO DEL
SISTEMA DE LA INTEGRACIÓN CENTROAMERICANA 442 (2008). Finally, the idea of a regional court to
pacify the region was resurrected at the beginning of the 1990s, during the peace negotiations of
Esquipulas I and II and was coupled with the need of establishing a Community law Court in the context
of the creation of the SICA.
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legal field, which ended up being characterized by two main views related
to regional laws and institutions.
For more than a century, the field—together with the main interests and
ideology of the lawyers willing to build a Central American court—revolved
more around the dream of pacifying a seemingly uniform yet utterly divided
region rather than around regional economic integration. The fulfillment of
such a dream, however, was not—or at least not only—related to the
development of a technical and apolitical system of Community norms
aimed at building a common market, but rather with the creation of
institutional and legal tools able to mend all the conflicts of the region and
to enforce the rule of law at the national and regional levels.114
In the early 1950s, however, the balance of power within the field was
altered, and the movement related to pacification through international and
constitutional law was paralleled by a project focused on economic
development through international organizations. It is in this context that the
Organization of Central American States (ODECA) (1951) and the Central
American Common Market (CACM) (1962) were established.115 Initially,
the ODECA and the CACM did not envision the establishment of judicial
institutions, as the main actors of the systems believed that regional
integration was a mere intergovernmental affair.116 Over time, however, the
ODECA and the CACM nurtured a new generation of lawyers, whose
professional orientation and interests leaned more towards developing some
form of legalized and judicialized version of Central American integration.
Importantly, the two movements highlighted above—related to
pacification and regional economic integration respectively— merged
during the 1990s, when the present CACJ was established in the context of
the reformation of the regional integration project and of the peace
negotiations of Esquipulas I and II. In connection to this, it is of pivotal
importance to mention that, during the negotiations leading to the
establishment of the present CACJ, a close network of powerful lawyers—
the Presidents of the Supreme Court of the Central American States—took
the lead in drafting the Statute of the Court. A few years before the Court’s
opening, while the Central American Heads of Government were finalizing
both the peace negotiations of Esquipulas and the reforms leading to the
SICA, the judges of the Supreme Court had reestablished an old and highly
114. Interviews n.7, n.8.
115. RAFAEL A. SANCHEZ SANCHEZ, THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION 51
(2009).
116. Although, formally, the Carta de San Salvador II, in amending the ODECA, formally created
a Central American Court of Justice. Carta de la Organizacion Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA), art.
2, Dec. 12, 1962, available at http://www.rijia.org/assets/1carta-de-la-organizacion-de-la-odeca.pdf.
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respected institution of Central American legal history—the Central
American Judicial Council—with the goal of bonding the judicial powers of
the Central American States and of suggesting reforms aimed at smoothing
out the legal differences among them.117 Hence, once Heads of Government
realized that the future SICA had to also encompass the establishment of a
regional (economic) court, they delegated to the judges at the Judicial
Council the task of drafting the Statute of the SICA Court.
Differently from the Heads of Government, who wanted to equip the
SICA with an EU-style regional economic court, the judges at the Judicial
Council were part of those lawyers who envisioned Central American law as
a tool for democratization and pacification. Accordingly, in drafting the
Statute of the Court, they did not only create a Court specialized in building
a common market, but also an institution aimed at continuing the tradition of
regional judicial institutions designed to pacify and democratize the Central
American region by legal means.118
In so doing, they deliberately revived the institutional make-up and
ideology of the—for them—mythical Cartago Court. Similar to the old
Court, the CACJ was vested with the task of: a) “representing the national
conscience of Central America;” and b) “being the depository and the
guardian of the values that constitute the Central American nationality.”119
Moreover, in addition to the EU-like Community Law jurisdiction requested
by the Heads of Government, the judges delegated to the CACJ several
competencies clearly aimed at making the CACJ an institution able to make
a difference in the Central American pacification and democratization
process. Most notably, the power to rule in inter-state conflicts and in
separation of powers disputes within the constitutional organs of the Member
States.120 Finally, once the judges finalized the proposal for the Statute of the
CACJ, they sent it to the Heads of Government, who approved and ratified
it without further changes.
Also in the case of the CACJ, this diachronic and actor-based analysis
provides key evidence for explaining the Court’s involvement in politically
sensitive issues. The history prior to the establishment of the present CACJ
reveals that the Court is not only a product of the legalization process
triggered by the end of the Cold War, but also the resultant of several and
overlapping dialectics between the different levels of structures and
discourses of power that had shaped the emerging field of Central American
117. It is actually in this context that the first proposal for a CACJ aimed at fostering the process of
pacification of Central America was advanced.
118. Interviews n.7, n.8, n.9.
119. Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, supra note 1, at 10.
120. See id. at 13.
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law over time. Most notably, democratization and pacification through legal
and judicial means.
Similar to the case of the CCJ, this is not a mere historical curiosity.
The CACJ’s involvement in politically sensitive issues is a consequence of
the fact that the main structuring forces of the Central American legal field—
and accordingly the main professional interests and visions of law of the
legal and political elites within such field—focused not only on
economically and legally integrating the region, but also—and above all—
on issues related to the pacification and democratization of the Central
American region. The idea of establishing a regional economic court to foster
integration was, henceforth, a relatively recent occurrence that layered on
top of a long-lasting discourses of ideas and power, mostly centered on
pacification and democratization. This, in my view, explains the
predisposition—or at least the missing reluctance—of the CACJ in getting
involved with politically sensitive issues.
B.

Career Paths of the Judges of the CACJ and of the CCJ and Influence
in the Two Courts’ Activities.

Additional evidence accounting for the involvement of the CACJ and
the CCJ in politically sensitive issues is provided by the career paths of the
judges eventually chosen to constitute the benches of the two Courts, by their
professional networks, and by their positioning within the Central American
and Caribbean legal fields.
Making sense of common cognitive and normative frameworks requires
accounting for the personal ties, connections, visions of the world, and
professional interests of those individuals who have guided such
constructions.121 This is even more compelling with regard to weakly
structured and still fragmented polities, like the Central American and the
Caribbean ones, where the existence and formation of trans-national and
cross-sectoral groupings of professionals are instrumental to the progressive
framing of regional laws.
1. The Judges of the CCJ as a Microcosm of the Caribbean Legal Field
The professional profiles of the judges eventually chosen for the bench
of the CCJ constitute a microcosm of the socio-political struggles of the
Caribbean legal field, including the different constructions of transnational
law between English Common Law and Caribbean Community Law and the

121. See generally Antoine Vauchez, The Making of the European Union’s Constitutional
Foundations: the Brokering role of Legal Enterpreneurs and Networks, in TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS
IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: GOVERNING EUROPE 1945-83 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2010).
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opposed constituencies that characterized the legal history of the region (the
older and the younger lawyers).
In addition to individuals with a clear expertise in Caribbean
Community Law,122 the majority of the CCJ’s judges are specialized in
constitutional and public international law; two of them were even appointed
as judges at the JCPC right before being called at the CCJ. Key figures in
this regard are the two Presidents of the Court, Michael de la Bastide and Sir
Dennis Byron. Besides being obvious supporters of the project of the
CARICOM, they were both well-known members of the English-educated
Caribbean legal elites, and, like them, they envisioned Caribbean
Community Law not only in terms of economic law but, mostly, in terms of
(national and international) human and fundamental rights. Both de la
Bastide and Sir Byron are what contemporary sociology defines as members
of a “transnational power elite,” lawyers able to practice law across legal
cultures and systems by making use of their transnational legal education and
networks.123
The very first President of the CCJ—Michael de la Bastide—was a
well-known pan-Caribbean lawyer, former President of the Law
Association, and former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago. He graduated
from Oxford in 1959/60 and became member of the Gray’s Inn in London
(1956); he was even appointed to the JCPC in 2004, less than three weeks
before accepting the role of President of the CCJ.124 In Trinidad and Tobago,
his career involved key venues of the legal and political elite: he had been
Queen’s Council (QC), independent Senator, a member of various
government commissions, Crown Counsel in the office of the Attorney
General, and, finally, Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago from 1995 to
2002. Most importantly, de la Bastide was known as a strong supporter of

122. Two judges of the CCJ had a clear expertise in CARICOM Law. Justice Duke Pollard (Guyana)
studied at the University of London and had been the Legal Advisor of the Commonwealth Secretariat,
as well as the CARICOM Secretariat. At the time of his appointment, Justice Pollard had made himself a
name as an expert jurist in international law, international economic law, the Law of the Sea, the Law of
Treaties, as well as general integration law and economic integration law. He was clearly meant to be the
CARICOM Law expert of the bench. In 2010 Justice Pollard retired and he was replaced by a lawyer
expert in international law, human rights, and CARICOM Law. Justice Winston Anderson (Jamaica),
who studied law at Cambridge, received a Doctorate in Philosophy from Cambridge in 1988. He majored
in International and Environmental Law. The same year he was called to the Bar of England and Wales
as a Barrister of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn. He also served as Dean of the Faculty of Law
of the UWI. Most importantly, from 2003 to 2006 he was also appointed as General Counsel of the
CARICOM Secretariat.
123. See TRANSNATIONAL POWER ELITES: THE NEW PROFESSIONALS OF GOVERNANCE, LAW AND
SECURITY 1 (Niilo Kauppi & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2013).
124. Interview n.2.
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the replacement of the JCPC with a Caribbean Court of Appeal, as also
revealed by his writings.125
The influence of de la Bastide in the early days of the Court is
remarkable. Initially, he played a key role in setting up the newborn Court
and in the appointment of the other judges to the bench,126 who, in his view,
had to be first class jurists able to recognize the intricacies of the various
interests at play in the Caribbean legal fields.127 In particular, de la Bastide’s
main mission was to make the CCJ the ultimate arbiter of a purely Caribbean
jurisprudence. In this regard, it is probably not accidental that de la Bastide—
together with Justice Adrian Saunders, who is another member of the old
English-educated legal elite128—were the two judges chosen to deliver the
main judgment of the CCJ in Joseph and Boyce. The pro-human rights and
anti-death penalty outcome of the case clearly represent the view of the two
judges, who in their previous careers had already distinguished themselves
as outspoken supporters of the need to make the present CCJ into an
institution able to make a difference in the protection and enforcement of
human and fundamental rights in the Caribbean.
A similarly important role was played by the second President of the
CCJ, Sir Charles Dennis Byron, who, in addition to his strong Common Law
background (he graduated from Cambridge, was called to the bar of the Inner
Temple, pursued private practice with chambers in Saint Kitts & Nevis and,

125. See, e.g., Michael de la Bastide, The Case for a Caribbean Court of Appeal, 5 CARIBBEAN L.
REV. 401, 403 (1995).
126. The judges of the CCJ are appointed by a unique organ, the Regional Judicial and Legal
Services Commission, of which the President of the CCJ is the Chairman. See Agreement Establishing
the Caribbean Court of Justice, art. 5, Feb. 14, 2011, available at http://www.caribbeancourt
ofjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ccj_agreement.pdf.
127. Other judges were experts in Caribbean Common and National Laws, as in the cases of: Justice
Rolston Nelson (Trinidad & Tobago), who, after having studied at the University of Oxford and
University of London, had practiced law in Jamaica and in Trinidad & Tobago, as well at tutored law in
Jamaica and in Trinidad & Tobago; Justice Adrian Saunders (St. Vincent and the Grenadines), who
studied at the University of West Indies and at the Hugh Wooding Law School of Trinidad & Tobago,
before being appointed Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court; Justice Desiree Bernard
(Guyana), who studied law at the University of London, before being appointed as Chief Justice, and
Chancellor of the Judiciary of Guyana. Together with Justice de la Bastide, these three judges are part of
that old elite of Caribbean lawyers that had developed a vision of Caribbean Community Law in terms of
fundamental rights. In addition to experts in International Law and national Caribbean laws, the bench
was completed with two judges, whose expertise was on Civil and European Law, as well as Business
Law, including trusts: Justice Jacob Wit (the Netherlands), who studied law at the Vrije Universiteit of
Amsterdam, and had held the position as Judge at the Joint Court of Justice of the Netherlands, Antilles
and Aruba. He was clearly intended to be the civil law (and EU law) judge on the court; Justice David
Hayton (England), who studied law at the Newcastle University, before ending up as law professor and
Dean of the Faculty of Law of the King’s College of London, combining academia and practice as a
world-leading authority on the law of trusts.
128. See id.
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in 2004, was appointed to the JCPC), also brought to the Court his significant
experience in Caribbean constitutional law and international human rights,
himself being former Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
and former President of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda.129 Since the beginning of his term, Sir Byron indicated his
intention to expand the outreach of both jurisdictions of the Court toward
encompassing human and fundamental rights.130 The most significant
development in this regard can be found in the Maya and Myrie cases
discussed above. Through these decisions, the Byron Court not only
reinforced its role as ultimate arbiter of a Caribbean jurisprudence in the
Appellate Jurisdiction—hence, following the steps of the de la Bastide
Court—but also added an additional and more international dimension to its
practices, in line with the more internationally oriented professional profile
of its new President: with the Maya case, the CCJ allowed international
human rights treaties to play a broader role in the Caribbean national legal
orders; with Myrie, it deliberately transformed the Original Jurisdiction from
a venue for CARICOM-related and economic disputes into an additional site
for the protection and enforcement of human and fundamental rights for
Caribbean citizens.
In conclusion, once approached from this agent-based perspective, the
CCJ’s proclivity for getting involved with politically sensitive issues
becomes less surprising. In fact, this is a consequence of the professional
expertise of the judges eventually chosen to sit on its bench, who, with two
exceptions, had almost no expertise on CARICOM Law and were for the
most part human rights and constitutional law lawyers.
2. The CACJ as an Extension of the National Judiciaries
As to the CACJ, of particular importance is the fact that, from its
inception to the present, the Court was filled with either former Supreme
Court judges or with public international law attorneys. Only a few of them
were and are experts of SICA Law.131 The first batch of judges (1994-2005)
was constituted by an overwhelming majority of former members of national
Supreme Courts. Illustrative in this regard were the two Nicaraguan judges—

129. The Right Honourable Sir Charles Michael Dennis Byron, CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE,
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/judges/byron.
130. Interview n.1.
131. This is hardly surprising as, like the Statute of the Court, the procedure for appointing the judges
of the CACJ was decided by the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the Central American States, who
made sure to be in charge of appointing the judges of the CACJ.
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Dr. Orlando Trejos Somarriba132 and Dr. Rafael Chamorro Mora133— who
were not only part of the national judiciaries but were also tightly linked to
that close network of Supreme Court judges who had established the CACJ
as a tool for pacifying the Central American region. Concerning the
remaining members of the first group,134 a special mention must be granted
to one of the two Honduran judges, Dr. Roberto Ramírez. Dr. Ramírez was
the person appointed by the Central American Judicial Council to produce a
preliminary study on the feasibility of the CACJ and, most likely, the one
who initially suggested to make the present Court into an institutional revival
of the old Cartago Court as well as an institution chiefly aimed at pacifying
the Central American region.135
The tendency of filling the bench of the CACJ with either former
national judges or with public international law lawyers was confirmed with
the appointment of the second batch of judges (2005-2015). Here, it is worth
mentioning Dr. Ricardo Acevedo Peralta, from El Salvador, who, before
being selected at the CACJ, had been Professor of International Law,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador (1984-1989), member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations (1988-1995), member
of the Salvadorian Parliament (1991-1995), member of the Central American
Parliament (1986-2001), and, finally, agent of El Salvador before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (2003-2005). Other important figures are:
Dr. Guillermo Augusto Pérez Cadalso Arias, from Honduras, who had been
Professor of International Law at the Autonomous Nacional University of
Honduras, and Judge of the Supreme Court of Honduras; and Dr. Darío

132. Dr. Trejos Somarriba was the former President of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua and of the
Central American Judicial Council. He also played a central role in negotiating the Statute of the Court
and in its inception.
133. Dr. Chamorro Mora graduated from the Central American University of Managua and had been
President of the Court of Appeal and former Judge of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua as well as Secretary
of the Central American Judicial Council.
134. In addition to the two Nicaraguan judges, the bench of the CACJ was composed of the following
individuals. For El Salvador: Dr. Jorge Antonio Giammattei Avilés, who graduated from the Autonomous
University of Guadalajara, had been Attorney at Law representing the interests of several international
and Central American companies, Professor of Law at the Autonomous University of Guadalajara (among
other things, he taught Customs and Central American Community Law), and judge of the Supreme and
Constitutional Court of El Salvador; and Dr. Fabio Hércules Pineda, who graduated from the Faculty of
Law of the University of El Salvador, and had been judge of the Constitutional Law department of the
Supreme Court of El Salvador. The other judges from Honduras were Dr. Adolfo León Gómez, Professor
of Mercantile Law, Political Economy and Finances in several Honduran Universities, who had been a
Member of the Commission for the reformation of the Honduran judiciary, Dr. Roberto Ramirez who
passed away in 1997 and was substituted by Dr. José Eduardo Gauggel Rivas, who had been Professor
of Law at the University of San Pedro Sula, and Judge of the Honduran Supreme Court. Judge Gauggel
Rivas. Dr. Rivas, however, quit his position in 1998.
135. See generally GUTIERREZ G., supra note 112.
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Francisco Lobo Lara, also from Honduras, who had been Professor of Law
at the National Autonomous University of Honduras as well as Ambassador
of Honduras at the United Nations.136 Dr. Lobo Lara repeatedly voiced the
importance of the CACJ as a tool for pacifying the Central American region
and for protecting and enforcing the rule of law in the national systems.137
The influence of jurists with clear expertise in constitutional and/or
international law on the activity of the CACJ is remarkable, and it has
inevitably led the Court to be involved with politically sensitive issues. To
begin with, in many instances, the present CACJ did not hesitate in
corroborating the thesis of the institutional continuity with the Cartago
Court. Illustrative in this regard is the reasoning that led the CACJ to impose
its jurisdiction over Costa Rica in the case Association of Custom Agents of
Costa Rica v. Costa Rica.138 In this case, the CACJ asserted its power to have
jurisdiction over Costa Rica by relying on the fact that, over time, the State
had accepted the jurisdiction of a Central American Court in more than one
instance: firstly, in 1907 (the Cartago Court), secondly in 1962 (the ODECA
Court), and finally, in 1991 by ratifying the Protocol of Tegucigalpa. This
reasoning, in turn, confirms that the present judges of the CACJ perceive
their Court not only as an institution aimed at building a common economic
space among the Central American States, but also as the continuation of a
long project of regional pacification through judicial means, initiated by the
Cartago Court and resurrected by the present CACJ.
The peculiar expertise and interests of the CACJ’s judges also
influenced Court’s activity in other cases. Perhaps the most important in this
regard are the Bolaños case and the three cases connected to the territorial
disputes between Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. In all of these
instances, the CACJ not only showed its inclination to deal with issues of
constitutional and international nature, but also showed that these topics best
fit the interests and the capacities of its judges. As shown elsewhere, the
CACJ has also produced several rulings dealing with the less politically
salient issues of implementation and enforcement of SICA Law.139 Yet, these

136. The remaining judges were: for Nicaragua, Dr. Silvia Isabel Rosales Bolaños, a lawyer
specialized in Criminal Law and Procedure, who had been Judge of the Criminal Law section of the
Nicaraguan Supreme Court and an activist known for her role in the protection of women and children’s
rights; and Dr. Carlos Antonio Guerra Gallardo, who had been Member of the Human Rights
Commission, Member of the Nicaraguan Parliament and Judge of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. El
Salvador appointed Dr. Julio Enrique Acosta Baires, a lawyer specialized in Mercantile Law, who had
been Dean of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at the Alberto Masferrer University of El Salvador
and Judge of the Supreme Court of El Salvador.
137. FRANCISCO DARIO LOBO LARA, CONFLICTOS ENTRE PODERES DEL ESTADO 155 (2012).
138. Case no. 87–06–08, 54 (CACJ 2008).
139. Caserta, supra note 3, at 592–600.
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judgments hardly had concrete impact on the ground and have been even
criticized from many quarters for being out of touch both with the reality of
the Central American process of regional integration and with the difficult
political situation in which several states of the region navigate.140
Conversely, judgments like the Bolaños case—though criticized for
politicizing the Court too much—or like those between Honduras, Costa
Rica and Nicaragua, are generally recognized as the most important
contributions of the Court both to the development of Central American
Community Law and to the pacification of the Central American region.
C.

The Jurisprudence of the Two Courts as a Legitimization Strategy

From the analysis conducted above, the involvement of the two Courts
in politically sensitive issues reflects both the general structuring dynamics
of the Central American and Caribbean legal fields as well as the
professional profiles of the judges of the two Courts. Therefore, I argue that
these politically sensitive rulings of both the CACJ and the CCJ constitute
part of a legitimization strategy of the judges, who have attempted to make
their Courts reflective of the various struggles at play in the Central
American and Caribbean legal fields.
As to the CCJ, the judges tried to make the Court’s practices palatable
to the different constellations of legal elites at play in such field; most
notably, to those lawyers advocating for severing the ties with the JCPC and
to those who feared that by abandoning the English judicial system, the
human and fundamental rights standards in the region would be curtailed.
This legitimation strategy is evident in many of the cases decided by the
Court. With Joseph and Boyce, the CCJ dismissed the charges of being a
“hanging court”—thus silencing the critiques of some pro-JCPC lawyers—
and showed that it was much more than a local epigone of the English Court.
This, in turn, demonstrated to the whole Caribbean legal environment that
the CCJ is able and willing to become the ultimate arbiter of an indigenous
jurisprudence. The decisions of the Court in Myrie and Tomlinson can also
be read along these lines, as through them the CCJ signaled to the main
stakeholders of the CARICOM that its OJ is not only a venue for large panCaribbean businesses, but also a site for individuals to seek protection of the
rights granted to them by the RTC.
As to the CACJ, the judges aimed at triggering the interest of those
lawyers and politicians who envisioned Central American Community Law
as a tool to pacify and democratize the region. This legitimization strategy is
evident in many of the cases decided by the Court. The two cases between
140. Interviews n.4, n.9.
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Nicaragua and Honduras and the one between Nicaragua and Costa Rica are
clear attempts by the judges to place the CACJ at the top of the Central
American legal systems and to make it into the sole and ultimate arbiter for
inter-state disputes in the region. The same rationale lies behind the Bolaños
case, by means of which the Court has attempted to impose its authority as
the ultimate enforcer of the rule of law within the legal system of each of its
Member States.
To conclude, I wish to return to the underlying theoretical discussion of
this paper. In particular, the experiences of the CACJ and the CCJ show that
the idea advanced by many authors, according to which recently established
ICs must not be involved with politically sensitive disputes to avoid political
pushbacks,141 may not always be the right strategy for ICs entrenched in
socio-political contexts where national understandings of legality and the
overall ideological and professional preferences of powerful legal elites are
not strongly linked to regional integration and economic law. In Weberian
terms,142 in their practices, the CACJ and the CCJ did not develop some kind
of formal and neutral legal rationality àl’européenne, but instead aimed at
producing substantively thick regional legal systems with the goal of
overcoming the structural limitation of the national ones and, eventually, of
legitimizing the two regions in the eyes of the major stakeholders of their
systems.
Finally, both the CACJ and the CCJ have become involved with
politically sensitive issues because, at their roots, they are not—or at least
not only—EU-style ICs, but the international manifestation of national and
regional processes of social and legal reproduction encompassing the various
forms of legality that have characterized the Central American and
Caribbean social fields over time.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
On the side of developing technical and apolitical bodies of Community
Law, both the CACJ and the CCJ have come to rule over politically sensitive
issues, ranging from freedom of movement to issues of mega-politics. In
doing so, both Courts have expanded the reach of their competencies,
emphasizing the respect of fundamental rights, democracy, rule of law, and
good governance. This paper has sought to explain the behavior of these two
Courts and the reasons why they have avoided significant pushbacks by their
Member States. It has done so by analyzing the trans-historical trajectories
of the main structuring forces of the Central American and Caribbean social
141. Alter, supra note 12; Madsen, supra note 12.
142. See generally KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2004).
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and legal fields and the professional paths of the judges eventually chosen to
sit on the benches of the two Courts. Through such analysis, the article shows
that both the CACJ and the CCJ were only partially established to pursue
regional economic integration and that the interests of the agents that
participated in their creation as well as of their judges revolved mostly
around pacification and democratization in Central America and
decolonization through the development of a system of human and
fundamental rights in the Caribbean. In turn, these interests have
significantly impacted the two Courts’ institutional outlook and practices,
making them willing to engage into politically sensitive issues rather than
act as mere regional economic courts.
These findings have important theoretical consequences. Most notably,
ICs cannot be explained solely by looking at the moment in which they were
established (as, for the most part, delegation theories do) and that they cannot
be constrained in fixed and static definitions provided a priori (i.e. OldStyle or New-Style, economic or human rights ICs) but that each singular IC
is the consequence of highly differentiated socio-political and historical
contexts which respond not only to general global forces but also—if not
above all—to national and regional conditions and interests. ICs are, hence,
not unitary, homogenous, and discrete units influenced by rational behavior
and institutional design, but are instead social facts to be investigated as a
product of the societies in which they are embedded, as they are the result of
broad structural developments, collective (most times adversarial) human
action, professional and group interests, socialization, and identity
formation.143 In other words, ICs are both deeply rooted in national legal
cultures and power positions, while at the same time have developed specific
international traits.

143. Similar to what is claimed in FREDRIK SÖDERBAUM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
REGIONALISM: THE CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 31 (2004).
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VII.APPENDIX
Interviews Cited
Interview n.1, October 21, 2013 at 10:00 am with a Trinidadian Lawyer
Interview n.2, October 21, 2013 at 3:00 pm with a Judge of the CCJ
Interview n.3, November 6, 2013 at 9:00 am with a Barbadian
Government Official
Interview n.4, July 9, 2014 at 9:30 am with a Nicaraguan Professor of Law
Interview n.5, July 10, 2014 at 11:00 am with a Member of the
Administrative Personnel of the CACJ
Interview n.6 July 10, 2014 at 5:30 pm with a Nicaraguan Legal Official
Interview n.7, July 10, 2014 at 5:30 pm with a Nicaraguan Legal Official
Interview n.8, July 12, 2014 at 11:00 am with a Judge of the CACJ
Interview n.9, July 17, 2014 at 11:00 am with a Salvadorian Professor of
International and Central American Law

